Revolution and the Weight of Oil
The Republic is Born
On September 26, 1962, a revolution erupted in Sana'a.
Military officers loyal to Arab nationalist ideology stormed the palace, shelled the residence of Imam Muhammad al-Badr, and announced the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).
The Imam escaped. From the northern mountains, he called on the Hashid and Bakil tribes to defend him. What followed was an eight-year civil war that would leave the new republic barely functional and deeply indebted to its supporters.
Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Art of Survival
By 1978, a military officer named Ali Abdullah Saleh maneuvered his way to power. Saleh would rule Yemen for 33 years through a politics of tactical brilliance and ruthless pragmatism.
Saleh understood Yemen at a fundamental level. He knew he couldn't build institutions because Yemen's power lay with tribes and military families, not bureaucracies. So instead, he built something else: a patronage network.
He took oil revenues—modest by global standards but significant for Yemen—and distributed them directly as cash payments to:
- Tribal chiefs (over 4,000 of them received monthly stipends)
- Military commanders (who were allowed to inflate payrolls with "ghost soldiers" and pocket the extra pay)
- Religious scholars and Islamist organizations
- Selected merchant families with trade monopolies
This system worked brilliantly for the 1990s and 2000s. As long as oil revenues flowed, Saleh could pay everyone. The price of maintaining power was simply being willing to distribute the wealth.
Saleh famously described his governing style as "dancing on the heads of snakes"—meaning he maintained power by balancing rival factions against each other, rewarding just enough to keep them loyal while never allowing any single group to become dominant.
The Houthis: From Religious Movement to Military Power
In the 1990s, a religious revivalist movement emerged in the northern city of Sa'dah. Called the Believing Youth (Al-Shabab al-Mu'min), it was founded by a scholar named Hussein al-Houthi.
The movement was a response to two things:
Saudi-backed Salafi penetration: Conservative, ultra-orthodox Islamic seminaries backed by Saudi Arabia were spreading Salafi ideology through northern Yemen, directly challenging traditional Zaydi Islam.
Economic marginalization: The Sa'dah region was impoverished and neglected by Sana'a, receiving few resources or development investments.
Hussein al-Houthi transformed the Believing Youth into a political movement. He criticized Saleh's alliance with the United States and adopted the slogan: "God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, A curse upon the Jews, Victory to Islam."
When Saleh realized the movement was becoming a threat, he had al-Houthi arrested and then, in 2004, killed.
But al-Houthi's death transformed the movement. His family—particularly his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi—took over leadership. The movement, now called the Houthis, evolved from a religious revivalist group into a militant insurgency.
Between 2004 and 2010, the Yemeni military fought six brutal wars against the Houthis in Sa'dah Province. Each war was supposed to be the final defeat of the insurgency. Each time, the Houthis regrouped and counterattacked.
What became clear was that the Houthis had mastered something that had characterized Yemen for millennia: defensive mountain warfare. They used the jagged terrain of Sa'dah to ambush overextended military columns. They captured heavy weapons. They bled the army without ever confronting it in direct battle.
Oil Decline and State Collapse
By the late 2000s, Yemen's oil fields were in sharp decline. Production dropped from nearly 450,000 barrels per day in 2001 to under 250,000 by 2010.
This created a crisis for Saleh's entire system. If oil revenues were drying up, he couldn't distribute enough cash to keep all his factions satisfied. The patronage system that had held together an otherwise fragmented state was running out of money.
Simultaneously, the 2011 Arab Spring reached Yemen. Thousands of young people, frustrated with corruption, unemployment, and lack of opportunity, took to the streets. The demands were simple: Saleh must leave.
For several months, Saleh fought back. Security forces opened fire on unarmed protesters. But when military officers defected, when powerful tribal sheikhs withdrew support, when even his handpicked general Ali Mohsen switched sides, Saleh's position became untenable.
On November 23, 2011, Saleh signed a GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) agreement to step down. In exchange for his resignation, he was granted absolute immunity from prosecution—meaning he couldn't be tried for any crimes committed during his 33-year rule.
The Houthis Take Power
The transition period was supposed to be managed and orderly. A new government under Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was supposed to stabilize the country and implement democratic reforms.
It didn't work out that way.
By 2014, Hadi's government was weak and ineffective. He couldn't pay civil servants. He couldn't command the military. The economy was in free fall. Unemployment was rampant.
The Houthis, growing stronger in the north, saw an opportunity.
In September 2014, they mobilized supporters to surround Sana'a and demand that Hadi implement the promised political reforms. When negotiations failed, they stormed the capital. Hadi's security forces, many of which had implicit loyalties to Saleh (who still held influence), didn't fight back.
Within days, the Houthis controlled the government ministries, the state treasury, and the national media.
Hadi fled south to Aden, then (sensing military threats) fled further to Saudi Arabia.
By late 2014, Yemen had split into two competing governments:
The Northern Government: Controlled by the Houthis and remnants of Saleh's networks. Ruling from Sana'a.
The Southern Government: The weak, internationally-recognized government of President Hadi, claiming legitimacy but controlling little territory.
And that's when the situation internationalized.